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The impacts of program subsidy on productivity growth is investigated in this study.
Mundlak’s concept of endogeneity is applied to technical efficiency and generalized within a dual
framework. Technology is described by an aggregate cost fimction while technical efficiency is
conditional on a vector of state variables. Empirical evidence from the U.S. dairy sector supports
the hypothesis that protectionism, in the form of program subsidy, is the source of considerable
technical inefficiencies.
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Introduction
Since the pioneering work by Schultz
(1956), agricultural productivity measures have
enjoyed a great deal of interest among researchers.
As a result, a large body of the literature focused on
measuring productivity rates for comparative
purposes between regions or time periods, Further,
a great deal of attention has been given to
productivity decomposition work. Of particular
interest has been the influence of researeh
expenditures (both private and public), extension,
and schooling on productivity growth. Interestingly
enough, literature on the role of government
protectionist policies in determining productivity
rates is limited. What should one expect to be the
effects of government intervention on productivity
growth) Few studies have investigated this
relationship and the empirical evidence provided is
mixed,
In a provocative article over twenty years
ago Stlgler (1971) argued that the most obvious
contribution a group may ask the government for is
a cash subsidy, Numerous agricultural groups have
been quite successful in securing direct income
transfers from the government in the form of cash
subsidy, It has also been argued, however, that such
direct transfers are likely to generate technical
inefficiencies (Leibenstein), The main purpose of
this study is to investigate how protectionism in the
form of direct subsidies affects agricultural
productivity growth. In particular, the following
hypothesis is investigated:
Agricultural protectionism in the form of
program subsidies are the source of considerable
technical inefllciencies which in turn reduce
productivity growth.
*Lassaad Lachaal is a graduate research assistant in the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missottri-
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This hypothesis is empirically tested within
the framework of the U.S. dairy sector. The dairy
industry has been subjected to more government
involvement or regulation than most other domestic
agricultural industries, However, faced with the ever
growing costs of dairy programs, coupled with the
problem of excess milk supply, significant
provisions aimed primarily at reducing protection to
the sector have been recently added to federal dairy
programs.
Implicit in the hypothesis that government
subsidies influence technical efficiency and
productivity growth is the assumption of
endogenous technical efficiency. This assumption is
maintained throughout the study. To accommodate
such assumption in the empirical analysis,
Mundlak’s concept of endogeneity is applied to
technical efficiency and generalized within a dual
framework, As a result, production technology is
described by an aggregate cost function while
technical efficiency is conditional on a vector of
state variables, Parametric expressions of the
analytically derived cost function are subsequently
employed to empirically measure the effects of
appropriate state variables (government subsidies)
on technical efficiency and productivity growth.
The. rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
protectionism, efficiency, and productivity growth.
Section 3 develops the framework that links
subsidies to total factor productivity growth. Section
4 discusses the empirical modeLand restrictions for
its theoretical consistency, Data and estimation
procedure are presented in section 5, Results and
estimates of the impact of the subsidy on
productivity growth is presented in section 6, and
section 7 concludes.
Protection, Efficiency, and Productivity Growth
Most studies on costs of protection
assumed that much of the inefficiencies attributable
to protectionism are the result of misallocation of
resources. Empirical evidence, as summarized by
Leibenstein (1966), suggested that welfare gains
that can be achieved by reducing such allocalive
inefficiency are rather small. On the other hand,
technical inefficiency or X-inefficiency, as labeled
by Leibenstein, was found to increase costs of
protection by up to 50 percent. Leibenstein argued
that X-inefficiency involves firms failing to operate
at the outer-bound of their production possibilities
frontiers, He further maintained that this failure is
related to the allocation of managerial effort by the
firm and in many instances this phenomenon is the
result of protection.
Corroborating empirical evidence for
Leibenstein’s contention was provided by Bergsman
(1974) and Balassa (1975). The authors argued that
protectionism, by increasing technical inefficiency,
generate substantial welfare costs unaccounted for
by conventional costs of protection calculations.
Indeed, traditional costs of protection studies often
ignored the dynamic effects protection has on the
level of competitive pressure and technical
efficiency. This same theme was highlighted in
Scitovsky (1958), and explained the oilen
exceedingly small computed costs of protection.
Corden (1974), building on the concept of
X-inefficiency, analyzed the theoretical effects of
protectionism on managerial effort. First, the author
equated the reduction in managerial effort with an
increase in X-inefficiency. Then, using a partial
equilibrium model, he analyzed the effect of a tariff
on managerial effort in the import competing sector.
Corden concluded that the effect of a tariff on
managerial effort is, a priori, ambiguous. Whether
managers relax and become less efficient depends
upon whether the income effect of the tariff
outweighs the substitution of effort for leisure.
Building on Corden’s model, Martin (1978)
set forth the conditions that are needed to generate
the result that protectionism increases X-inefficiency
by reducing managerial effort. Using profit curves
and owner-manager’s preference map diagram, the
author was able to explain the ambiguity of
response to the tariff in terms of the income and
substitution effect of effort for leisure. Martin
concludes that protection increases X-inefficiency by
reducing managerial effort ifi (a) there is an income
distribution effect that raises managerial profits, (b)
leisure is a normal good, (c) income effects
outweigh the substitution effects. Further, he shows
(d) one needs only to look at the industry in
question; there are no further X-efficiency effects in
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Martin and Page (1983), focussing on the
allocation of effort to the management of an
enterprise, extended the above model of managerial
behavior by adding an external managerial labor
market component in the model, This latter was
then tested using firm level data in two subsidized
industries in Ghana. Empirical results were found to
support the hypothesis that subsidies to private
enterprise can have an adverse effect inefficiency.
Additional support for the existence of X-
inefficiency in agricultural production is provided by
Kalaitzandonakes and Bredahl (1993 and 1994). The
authors extended the model by Martin and Page to
include the missing effect of price protection on
technical change. The resulting model was then used
to examine the effects of price protection on each
component of productivity growth. They concluded
that the effect of protectionism on productivity
growth is a priori ambiguous, However, based on
few assumptions, they argued that protection may
have a positive effect on productivity growth for
low income industries by encouraging investment
and technical innovation. For high income
industries, protection is likely to have an adverse
effect on productivity growth by generating
technical and scale inefficiencies, These theoretical
considerations were then supported by empirical
evidence from two agricultural industries that have
been recentIy Liberalized,namely, the Japanese pork
and the New Zealand beef and sheep industries,
This study provides more empirical
evidence and a better understanding as to the nature
of the relationship between protectionism and
technical efficiency. It departs from previous studies
in a sense that it attempts to generalize Mundlak’s
endogeneity concept within a dual framework and
apply it to technical efficiency.
Methodological Framework
In this section an empirical model is
developed where technical efficiency is endogenous
and responsive to state variables which are
exogenous to the firm. In this sense, the firm is
assumed to observe a set of exogenous state
variables and make a decision about input level
usage and hence its efficiency level. Mundlak
(1988) developed the theoretical basis for
endogenous technology approach to productivity
measurement. Fulginiti and Pernn (1993) used a
similar approach focussing their investigation
mainly on the effects of prices as technology
changing variables,
In this paper Mundlak’s concept of
endogeneity is applied to technical efficiency and,
for empirical relevance, it is generalized on the dual
side. That is, technolo~ is defined by an aggregate
cost fimction conditional on a vector of state
variable S, For the purpose of this study the focus
is on program subsidies as a state variable. The
rationale behind including subsidies is clear:
protectionist policies (e.g., program subsidies) are
hypothesized to have an impact on economic
performance, both by distorting resource usage and
by increasing X-inefficiency. Both of these effects
are reflected by an increase in production costs.
Indeed, use of non optimal factors of production
will result in higher costs of producing a given level
of output. Similarly, program subsidies, by
increasing X-inefficiency, will also result in higher
unit costs of production.
The model development starts with
Mundlak’s unobserved (true) aggregate production
function (p.320),
F(m,s) = y“ (1)
where Y* denotes total optimal output; ~ the
optimum level of input vector X, and S is a vector
of state variables. Variations in state variables affect
not only the location on a given production fimction
but also determines the choice of the technology
and impacts efficiency. Thus, within this framework,
choice of the technology becomes dependent on
state variables S, Dual to this aggregate production
fhnction, we specify an aggregate (true) cost
fitnction of the form:
c = C(w”,y ’,s) (2)
where W denotes a vector of factor prices for
which the input vector chosen by the firm is
optimal; y* and S are as defined above. Note that
(W, y“) in aggregate cost (2) are unobsewed. By
allowing for a discrepancy between observed actual
costs and minimum costs, C(W, y*, $ can be
approximated by a set of functions such as the
general linear form 1302 Lachaal: Subsidies, Endogenous Technmal E@ciency and the Measurement of Productivip Growth




where C(~, y“, $ is the true ti.mction; C(W, y, S)
is the approximating fimction; each h, is a known,
twice continuously differentiable, numeric function
of (W, y, S); and each a, is a parameter to be
estimated. Expression (3) is attractive in that
parameter values a, can be chosen to ensure that, for
any arbitrary C(JV, y“, S), the expansion
approximates the value of the function, its first and
second partial derivatives in a neighborhood of (W,
y*).To generate this parsimonious flexible form we
expand C(w”, y“, $ using Taylor series
approximation to the second-order about a point
(w, y*). Let
a[)= C(W*,.V “,S,), ho= 1
[)
w- w“ al = VC(W*,y*,S), h] =
y-y*
LJ+lk:”l
a2 = V2C(W*,y*,S), h2 = 1 ‘-’*
(4)
It then follows that:
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(9)
Estimation of C(W, y, $) requires the estimation of
r(.), B(.), and Q( j which are unknown
fi.uwtionsin S and the unobserved variables (W’,y“).
Following Mundlak (1988), we consider r, B, and
Q as composite fimctions in S and expand the
fhnction around S. This yields:
r(w*,y*,~ z ~(,()+S’TC,() +S’7T20S (lo)
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where the m represent coefficients of the Where a dot over a variable denotes the logarithmic
approximating function, and the Qs are quadratic
terms to be dropped from the model as their
multiplication by w or y yields third degree terms time derivative. If we define TC = ~ ~ to be
that are unlikely to be relevant in the empirical part.
Combining equation (1O),(11), and (12) along with the productivity contribution of technological change
equation (6) yields the following estimable we can write
aggregate cost function:
(13)
C(w,y,s) = noo+s’7c,o+s’rt20s Tt7. = d-~, ~~, -&CYy-SC,S ’17)
+W’no, +w’n~ls
+W’?T ~,w+y’rco2
+.Y’7C #Y+y ’n ~2.Y
Introduction of state variables, as described by S, is cost flexibility of output and the cost flexibility of
exactly what differentiates this model from earlier subsidy, respectively. Consider now differentiating
ones. Subsidy, being an argument in the above both sides of C = Z, wfi, logarithmically with
fimction, should allow the identification of the respect to time and arranging terms yields:
impacts of program subsidy on technical efficiency
and productivity growth,
Subsidy, E@ciency and TFP
A decomposition of the general form of Substituting equation (18) into (17) yields:
(13) allows further insights on the role of subsidies
on productivity growth. Let S(s,t) wheres denotes
program subsidy and ttechnical change, Then, the
general form of(13) is: ~, %X, = &C~.i+sy+T~ (19) CY
c = q w,yJ,t) (14)
Totally differentiating (14) with respect to t and
omitting the argument wherever ambiguity does not
result, yields:
Defining the rate of change of total factor
productivity as:
(20)
which is the difference between output and input
growth rates, Substituting above one obtains:
(15)
Applying Shephard’s lemma and dividing through




‘c Ji3yc& Equation (21) decomposes total factor
productivity growth to its three components:
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technological change. These components of TFP can
be illustrated in the figure below. The first
component represents the subsidy effect on technical
efficiency and can be characterized by the vertical
distance AB between actual unit cost and potential
unit cost, An improvement in scale efficiency can
be characterized by a movement along the average
cost curve from B to C. This movement 1scaptured
by the second term of equation (21), Finally,
technological change is captured by the third term
of equation (21). This component can be
characterized by a downward shift of the average
cost curve and is represented by the distance CD.
Empirical estimation of (13) allows all
components of(21 ) to be quantified. In this way the
exact impact of subsidies on technical efficiency can
be separated from scale efficiency and technical
change, In the next section these procedures are
empmically employed for the US dairy industry.
Empirical Model: An Application to US Dairy
Sector
Policy background of ~heU.S. dairy sector
Most federal dairy programs have their
origins in the legislation enacted in the 1930s and
1940s. The Agricukural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937 provided for classified pricing and revenue
pooling in fluid milk markets under federal milk
marketing orders2, The Agricukutldl Act of 1949
provided for a permanent program of dairy price
supports. These two programs, along with import
restrictions, constitute the major dairy programs in
the United States. Import quota restrictions on
manufactured dairy products are used to prevent
imports of lower costs and subsidized dairy products
from overwhelming the U.S. dairy price supports.3
The basic structure of the dairy price
support program remained the same from 1949 to
1981. Mainly, the federal government supported
milk prices through purchases of butter, nonfat dry
milk, and American cheese. Purchwe price of the
above products are set in a way to enable
manufacturers to pay farmers the announced support
price for milk, However, faced with continued
surpluses and rising costs for this program, new
legislation was enacted m 1981 to relate minimum
support levels to the size of CCC purchases.4 This
represented a major departure from traditional price
support policies. In 1981, legislation was passed to
freeze support prices for two years and provided for
a total deduction of $1 per hundredweight (cwt)
from milk producers receipts to partially pay for the
rising costs of the program,
In 1983, the federal government amended
the 1949 Act to provide for a milk diversion
program. Under this program, producers who elect
to participate must agree to reduce their milk
marketing by up to 30 percent below their base
period production. By doing so producers received
a fixed payment of $10 per cwt of reduction in their
milk marketing. The main objective of this
program was to bring milk production in line with
demand for dal~ products.
Recently, a new amendment to the 1949
Act provided for a voluntary dairy termination
program, also known as the whole herd buy-out.
According to the terms of this program, milk
producers submit competitive bids to remove milk
production for at least 5 years based on their 1985
marketing. Participating producers would slaughter
or export all their female cattle. Further, a
contracted producer could not use the plant for milk
production or dairy cattle, One main objective of
this program was the reduction of U.S, milk
production capacity by removal of excess resources
attracted to the dairy sector. Other changes in dairy
price supports on January 1, 1988, 1989, and 1990,
were linked to annual government purchases.
Provisions authorized the secretary of agriculture to
reduce the support price 50 cents per cwt if net
price support purchases are to exceed 5 billion
pounds milk equivalent or increase the support price
if purchases are below 2.5 billion pounds milk
equivalent.
The above are the major price support
actions that have taken place since the passage of
the 1949 Agricultural Act, Much of this period and
up to the 1983 Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act,
dairy programs, with the exception of import
restrictions, have been used as income enhancing
tools5. This resulted in excess resources used in
milk production and processing. Increased revenues
through the program were realized from higher milk
prices, which resulted in increased production.
Indeed, in 1983 dairy producers produced 10J Agr. and Applied Econ , July, 1994
Figure 1. Decomposition of TFP Using Cost Functions
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percent more milk than consumers were willing to
buy at the supported prices, In response to this
situation, legislative changes of the early 1980shave
come to address the issues of excess supply and
rising government costs. Price support program
nominal costs have exceeded 1billion dollars a year
since 1979-80, Costs reached a record high of 2.6
billion dollars in the marketing year 1982-83.
Program costs for the 1988-89 marketing year were
down to 698 million dollars. This represented an
average of 5 thousand dollars per commercial dairy
farmer.
This reduction in price supports, coupled
with the dairy diversion program and the dairy
termination program resulted in a better control of
milk supply and program costs, Reduction in the
dairy capacity by removal of excess resources
should bring about more efficient use of resources,
lower costs of production, and make the U.S. dairy
sector more competitive,
Model specl~cation
The impacts of program subsidy on
technical efficiency level of the dai~ sector is
investigated within the framework of an endogenous
technical efficiency cost function, Particularly, a
restricted form of aggregate cost function in (13) is
used while a translog specification is chosen for the
empirical estimation (Christensen, Jorgenson, and
Lau 1973). Such specification allows for a flexible
description of the technology and subsidy effects, In
particular, the following empirical form for the
aggregate cost function is specified:
Where i,j denote inputs. For theoretical consistency
of our specification, homogeneity of degree one in
factor prices and symmetry conditions on the cross
price effects are imposed. These conditions imply
the following restrictions,
‘/1 = 1,
Zplz = o, for all i = 1, ..,, n
y)], = o,
B,, = B,l. for all i,j = 1, ,.., n
The cost share equations, which are used in the
estimation below, are derived using Shephard’s
lemma:
cs . aLnc .A, +~z BYLn Wz+D,~Lns (23)
J dLn W,
The translog cost formulation above allows for both
neutral and biased subsidy effects. Neutral subsidy
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leaving factor shares unchanged. This effect is
characterized by the parameters G. and G,,,.Biased
subsidy effects represent shifts in the level of input
utilization that alter the equilibrium factor shares,
holding factor prices constant and are characterized
by the parameter D,,. The cost elasticity of subsidy
and the cost elasticity of output are derived as
follows:
_ dLn C





Estimates of the above cost elasticity of output and
of the subsidy are used to account for the different
sources of total factor productivity (TFP) and assess
the effect of program subsidy on efficiency.
Data and Estimation Procedure
To implement the above specified model,
annual data from 1972 to 1992 of the U.S. dairy
sector were used. In particular, data on output, input
prices, government expenditures on dairy support,
and milk production costs were required. Three
broad categories of milk production costs were
assumed: costs of feed (F), costs of labor (L), and
costs of capital and material (M), Feed costs
included the costs of concentrate, hay, silage and
haylage, pasture and other feeds. Labor costs
included costs of hired labor and family labor.
Capital and material costs included the costs of fhel,
electricity, machinery, dairy supplies and other
miscellaneous material inputs. All above costs were
measured in dollars per hundredweight. For each of
these categories of inputs a Tornqvist price index is
computed; and 1977 was used as a base year, Milk
production was measured in millions of
hundredweight, Government expenditures on dairy
support is measured in millions of dollars. Sources
of these data are various issues of the Economic
Indicators of Farm Sector: Costs of Production-
Livestock and Dairy; as well as issues of
Agricultural Prices: Annual Summaries.
The procedure used to estimate the above
model follows Berndt and Christensen (1973b). The
empirical cost fi,mctiondeveloped here is considered
an approximation to the true underlying cost
fimction. Hence, the cost function specified in (22)
is jointly estimated with the cost share equations
(23). Imposition of the homogeneity in factor prices
and the symmetry condition across equations
requires that one cost share be omitted. Iterated
seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR), which is
invariant with respect to which share equation is
dropped, is used for the estimation of the system
(22) and (23).
Results
Table 1 presents the ITSUR estimates of
the parameters of the translog model. Most of the
parameters are statistically significant at the 5
percent significance level. Further, using the point
estimates it is verified that the translog is well
behaved at each sample point. That is monotonicity
and concavity conditions are found to hold for each
year.
To determine whether the subsidy had a
major effect on costs of production, the value of the
cost elasticity of subsidy is computed for every
sample point making use of equation (24), As
expected EC,was positive for every observation,
implying that a 10 percent increase in subsidy had
increased costs by up to 1.8 percent, This finding
comes to corroborate the argument advanced by
Leibenstein that protectionism may lead to up 50V0
increase in costs of protection. Part of this cost
increase can be explained by the industry’s failure
to use the least-cost mix of inputs due to the biased
effects of the subsidy, That is policies such as
program subsidy can create distortions of optimal
factor use. Indeed, parameter estimates of the
translog function reveal that the effect of the
subsidy has been input biasing, Namely, the subsidy
has been feed saving (D,, <0), neutral with respect
to labor (Dz,is statistically insignificant), and capital
and material using (D3J>0).
Next, given estimates of the cost elasticity
of subsidy e,, and the cost elasticity of output &,Y,
equation (21) is used to account for the different
sources of TFP growth and assess the implications
of subsidies on it. Accounting for these sources are
presented in table 2. A closer look at the annual
observations reveals the adverse effects of
government subsidies on technical efficiency. ThisJ Agr. and Applied Econ,, July, 1994
Table1.ITSUR Estimates of the Translog Cost Function Under SUR Error Terms Assumption
— .— —-
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Parameter Estimate Error Param=O























































I= Feed, 2= Labor, 3= Material, Y= Output, S= Subsidy, T= Technological change.
System R-square: 0.892.
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latter has been the lowest (negative rates) for the
years when government expenditures on dairy
support has been the highest (1980- 1986), This
tinding corroborates the advanced hypothesis that
government subsidies are a source of technical
inefficiencies.
Finally, input demand elasticities with
respect to the subsidy were estimated to assess the
impacts of subsidy on factor demands. The mean
values of these estimates over the period of
investigation are 0,028, 0.057, and 0,143 for feed,
labor and capital and material, respectively. These
estimates reveal the effect of program subsidy on
input demand, Namely, a 10 percent increase in
subsidy resulted in an increase of up to 0.2, 0,5, and
1.4percent in the demand for feed, labor and capital
and material, respectively.
Summary and Conclusions
The effects of protectionist policies in the
form of program subsidy on technical efficiency
was investigated in this study, Particularly, a
negative relationship between protectionism and
technical efficiency was hypothesized and tested in
the U.S. dairy sector. To achieve this end and
accommodate the endogeneity assumption of
technical efficiency, Mundlak’s concept of
endogeneity is applied to technical efficiency and
generalized within a dual framework, As a result
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Endnotes
1.The general linear form has been used for most general numeric approximations. It’s attractive for several
reasons: It can depict as many effects as the number of parameters it contains, It’s linear in parameters.
Finally, it can approximate (under relatively weak assumption) any arbitrary, twice continuously
differentiable function.310 [.achaal: Subsldles, Endogenous lkchnical E@ciency and (he Measurement of Productwlty Growth
2. Classified pricing is the Federal order pricing system under which regulated processors pay into the pool
for grade A milk according to the class in which it is used. With revenue pooling producers are paid a
weighted average, or “blend”, price for all uses of milk in a particular order or market. Producers
participating in the pool receive identical uniform blend prices, with adjustments for butterfat content and
location of the farm.
3. Imports of manufactured dairy products are set at 2.5 billion pounds of milk equivalent. This represents
only 2 percent of U.S. milk production in 1989.
4. Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC): A government-owned and operated corporation authorized to
borrow funds from the U.S. treasury to operate the USDA’s price and income support programs, to manage
government-owned stocks, and to administer their disposal through domestic and export programs.
5. Import quotas enhance prices to milk producers,